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On the mathematical foundations of Syntactic Structures
Geoffrey K. Pullum
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences
University of Edinburgh
5 April 2011
Abstract Chomsky’s highly influential Syntactic Structures (SS) has been much praised its
originality, explicitness, and relevance for subsequent cognitive science. Such claims are
greatly overstated. SS contains no proof that English is beyond the power of finite state
description (it is not clear that Chomsky ever gave a sound mathematical argument for that
claim). The approach advocated by SS springs directly out of the work of the mathematical
logician Emil Post on formalizing proof, but few linguists are aware of this, because Post’s
papers are not cited. Chomsky’s extensions to Post’s systems are not clearly defined, and the
arguments for their necessity are weak. Linguists have also overlooked Post’s proofs of the
first two theorems about effects of rule format restrictions on generative capacity, published
more than ten years before SS was published.
Keywords Generative grammar · transformations · Emil Post · formalization · proof
theory · mathematical logic
1 Introduction
In 1957, when Martin Joos first published his classic anthology of American structuralism,
Readings in Linguistics I (1957), it was offered as a contribution to a flourishing research
program. The same could be said about J. R. Firth’s collected Papers in Linguistics 1934-
1951 (Firth 1957) and the Philological Society’s definitive anthology of London-school lin-
guistics, Studies in Linguistic Analysis (Philological Society 1957), or about B. F. Skinner’s
long-awaited book about verbal behavior based on his William James Lectures from ten
years earlier (Skinner 1957). In retrospect, however, these works look like valedictions:
concluding summaries of paradigms that had reached their use-by dates.
In December 1957, Language published an extraordinarily laudatory review (Lees 1957)
of a short monograph that had been published on February 14 that year in a new series from a
small publisher in Holland. The book was Syntactic Structures (Chomsky 1957, henceforth
SS). The author was at the time an unknown 28-year-old who taught language classes at
MIT. The reviewer, Robert B. Lees, hailed SS as a revolutionary scientific breakthrough,
and from 1958 on, linguists began to pay it a great deal of attention.
Lees’s claims about revolution are controversial. Newmeyer (1986) argues that SS did
indeed spark a scientific revolution, and others disagree. I take no position here on that
question (a sociological one, as Newmeyer construes it). I will argue, however, that many
exaggerated claims have been made about SS, some of them straightforwardly false. For
example, the claim that in SS Chomsky gave a “proof” that “demonstrated the inadequacy
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2of finite state grammars” (Lyons 1970: 54) is not true: Chomsky did not even attempt such
a proof in SS (see section 2 below).
Recent claims about the content and effects of SS have been getting more extreme rather
than less. Josie Glausiusz says that Chomsky “in the 1950s proposed that all humans are
equipped with a universal linguistic grammar, a set of instinctive rules that underlie all lan-
guages” (Discover magazine, May 2007). But Chomsky made no proposals about innate
universal grammar in the 1950s. David Lightfoot calls SS “the snowball which began the
avalanche of the modern ‘cognitive revolution’ [that] originated in the seventeenth century
and now construes modern linguistics as part of psychology and human biology” (Light-
foot 2002: v). But SS contains not even a nod in the direction of the study of cognition or
17th-century thought.
When the reputation of a book gives rise to this kind of exaggeration and misattribution,
re-evaluation is called for. The task is a large one, and I do not aim to cover all aspects of
SS in this paper.1 My focus is on selected aspects of the mathematical and formal language-
theoretic underpinnings of SS.
2 The purported proof that English is not finite-state
It is widely believed that SS gives a proof that the stringset of all syntactically well-formed
sequences of English words is not a finite-state language (FSL). It does not. SS never at-
tempts a rigorous argument; it just informally adumbrates one, and then asserts that “it is
impossible, not just difficult, to construct a device of the [finite automaton] type . . . which
will produce all and only the grammatical sentences of English” (SS: 23). A weak generative
capacity proof is required to show that English is not an FSL, and SS did not give one.
Of course, SS was deliberately trying to keep things elementary—it originated as the
notes for a series of lectures for undergraduate scientists and engineers at MIT, and was
supposed to offer an informal digest of a technical paper, Chomsky (1956b), and a much
larger unpublished typescript, Chomsky (1956a, published much later with revisions and
omissions as Chomsky 1975). But in fact the earlier works do not contain a demonstration
of the non-FSL character of English either.
SS (p. 22) cites Chomsky 1956b, claiming it contains the “rigorous proof” to which SS
alludes, but this is not so. In the form originally given in Chomsky (1956b) it depended
on a cumbersomely defined relation of “(i, j)-dependency” holding between a string S of
length n, two integers i and j such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, and a language L over a vocab-
ulary A, and the attempted argument was not valid. The definitions are changed in the
1965 reprint version of the paper (a footnote credits E. Assmuss for pointing out a de-
fect in the original formulation): this revised version relies on a cumbersomely defined
ternary relation of ‘m-dependency’ between a sentence S, an integer m, and a stringset L,
where S = x1 a1 x2 a2 . . . xm am zb1 y1 b2 y2 . . . bm ym, and there is a unique mapping of the set
{1, . . . ,m} to itself (a “permutation”) meeting the following condition (I quote from p. 108):
there are {c1, . . . ,c2m} ∈ A such that for each subsequence (i1, . . . , ip) of (1, . . .m),
S1 is not a sentence of L and S2 is a sentence of L, where
(10) S1 is formed by substituting ci j for ai j in S, for each j ≤ p;
S2 is formed by substituting cm+α(i j) for bα(i j) in S1, for each j ≤ p.
The idea is that if in the string S the symbol ai is replaced by the symbol ci, restoring
grammaticality in L necessitates replacing bα(i) by cm+α(i).
From there, the crucially relevant mathematical step is to claim that an FSL can only ex-
hibit m-dependencies up to some finite upper bound on m (Chomsky says an m-dependency
1 For example, I will not discuss here the critique of statistical approaches to grammaticality (SS: 15–17),
though it was so influential that the now burgeoning work on stochastic approaches to grammar virtually
disappeared from the scene for thirty years. The claim that probabilistic models can never distinguish gram-
matical but unlikely nonsense sequences from ungrammatical sequences (SS: 16) was not true, but it was
not properly answered until Pereira (2000) showed what a huge difference it makes when a crude statistical
model that assigns zero probability to anything not yet attested is replaced by one that uses Good–Turing
‘smoothing’. I also omit discussion of the philosophical and historical background; for that, see Tomalin
(2006), Scholz & Pullum (2007), and Seuren (2009).
3needs at least 2m states; Svenonius 1957 says this is untrue, and m states will suffice). The
empirical claim is that English has no such upper bound, and is therefore not an FSL.
But Chomsky does not complete the argument by connecting these abstractions to En-
glish data; he merely points to some sentence templates (“If S1, then S2”; “Either S3, or S4”;
“The man who said that S5, is arriving today” [comma in original]), and asserts that through
them “we arrive at subparts of English with . . . mirror image properties” and thus “we can
prove the literal inapplicability of this model” (Chomsky 1956b, 1965 reprinting, p. 109).
Daly 1974 spends many pages attempting to work out how a sound argument for Chom-
sky’s conclusion might be based on the data that he cites. Chomsky seems to think that pairs
like 〈if, then〉 and 〈either, or〉 give rise to m-dependencies. Daly could not see how this
could be true. Nor can I. The words in these pairs can occur in sentences without the other
member of the pair. (The same is true of other pairs such as 〈neither, nor〉 and 〈both, and〉.)
It is not clear that there is any pair of lexical items σ and τ in English such that if ϕσψ is
grammatical then ψ = ψ1 τ ψ2 with |ψ1|> 0.
In addition, remarks like “we can find various kinds of non-finite state models within
English” (SS: 22–23) and the similar remark that “we arrive at subparts of English with
. . . mirror image properties” (Chomsky 1956b, 1965 reprinting, p. 109) suggest a failure to
appreciate that FSLs can have infinite non-finite-state subsets. Only if such a subset can be
extracted by some regularity-preserving operation like homomorphism or intersection with
a regular set does it entail anything about the language as a whole.
Thus it is not at all clear that Chomsky ever had an argument against English being an
FSL. Certainly none appears in SS, which contains far less on this than the 1956 paper.
The discussion in SS actually shows some signs of a confusion between the FSLs and
the strictly local (SL) stringsets. The exposition of finite-state systems in SS is particularly
informal: no definitions are given, grammars are not distinguished from accepting automata,
finite-state Markov processes are not distinguished from their transition graphs, and it is not
at all clear that Chomsky had a grasp of how rich and complex the class of FSLs is. He
gives only one example of an infinite FSL: the stringset denoted by the regular expression
the old∗((man comes)+(men come)). But this is not merely within the FSLs; it is in all of
the infinite hierarchy of classes of stringsets that Rogers & Pullum (2010) refer to as LTOk,
for k all the way down to 2; and it is in all the LTTk subsets of that (for k down to 2); and
in all the LTk subsets of that (for k down to 2); and in all the strictly k-local or SLk subsets
of that (for k down to 2). In other words, it is just about as low in the subregular hierarchy
as any infinite stringset class that is interesting enough to study—quite extreme in its low
language-theoretic complexity, and a singularly unrepresentative FSL.
The confusion is amplified by Lasnik (2000), a syntax textbook grounded in SS. Lasnik
considers (or alludes to) six different infinite FSLs (see pp. 12–16 and exercise 1 on p. 34):
(i) the old∗ ((man comes), (men come)); (ii) the man runs (and runs)∗; (iii) a∗b∗; (iv) (a,b)∗;
(v) my sister laughed (and laughed)∗; (vi) Mary saw three (very)∗ old men. Every one of
these is an SL2 stringset.
Confusion between the FSLs and much smaller stringset classes such as SL2 has been
problematic at various points in the subsequent literature on the psychology of language.
Bever, Fodor & Garrett (1968) criticize associationist psychology by linking it to a language-
theoretic property that appears to pick out the SL class, but do not expositorily distinguish
that from the FSLs (see Pullum & Scholz 2007 for discussion). And experiments on syntactic
pattern recognition in non-human organisms such as those conducted by Fitch & Hauser
(2004) have clearly suffered from a failure to differentiate finite state from SL2, which has
given rise to statements in the literature about monkeys being able to learn arbitrary FSLs
(see Pullum & Scholz 2009, Rogers & Pullum 2010).
3 The foundational work of Emil Post
With finite-state description supposedly ruled out, the plan that SS aims to pursue is to intro-
duce context-free phrase structure grammars (CF-PSGs) next, and show their effectiveness
in defining a range of simple clause structures, and then to show that those also have fail-
ings, and thus motivate the introduction of a new class of rules to augment CF-PSG: trans-
formations. The combination of CF-PSG with transformations defines the “transformational
4model for linguistic structure” (SS: 6), later known as transformational-generative grammar
(henceforth TGG).
TGG is generally assumed to have sprung entirely from Chomsky’s work, specifically
his large unpublished manuscript (Chomsky, 1956a) and the brief undergraduate-lecture di-
gest of it that was published as SS. While linguists are aware that the term “transformation”
comes from the work of Chomsky’s mentor Zellig Harris, and some have noted that Harris
probably took the term from Carnap (1934), it has gone almost entirely unremarked that
the underlying mathematics is largely present in much earlier work, overlooked by linguists
because Chomsky never cited it. The machinery that TGG employs (though not the propos-
als about how generative grammars for natural languages should be structured) originates
in the mathematicization of logical proof by the great Polish-born American mathematical
logician Emil Leon Post (1897–1954).
3.1 Proof theory and production systems
In his 1920 doctoral dissertation, published as 1921, Post undertook the task of formaliz-
ing the logic assumed by Whitehead and Russell in Principia Mathematica, providing a
provably correct syntactic proof system for it, and showing that the resultant system was
decidable. What he ended up with was the discovery that this program could never succeed:
there cannot be a decision procedure for theoremhood. But he created new subfields in the
process. In particular, he developed a generative characterization of the recursively enumer-
able (r. e.) sets, and later laid the foundations of recursive function theory (see Post 1944, on
which most of Rogers 1967 can be seen as an extended commentary).
Post formalized logical proof through the use of purely syntactic string manipulations
defined by rules that he called “productions”. A production associates a set of string schemata
{φ1, · · · ,φn} with a new string schema φn+1, one that φ1, · · · ,φn are said to “produce” (or
guarantee the derivability of). Intuitively, if axioms or already derivable strings can be found
to match {φ1, · · · ,φn} by fixing appropriate values of the variables therein, then the string
matching φn+1, under the same assignment of values to variables, is thereby guaranteed to
be derivable. In the case of an inference rule, instantiations of φ1, · · · ,φn are premises and
the instantiation of φn+1 is a conclusion whose legitimacy or provablity those premises are
sufficient to guarantee. But production systems were defined in a way so general that they
could cover the formation rules and the definition of the set of axioms as well.
A “canonical production system” was defined as a set of initially given strings over some
finite symbol inventory (axioms, or “primitive assertions”), together with a set of produc-
tions. The set of outputs of such a system (the set of theorems or “assertions” in the case
of a logic) was defined as the smallest set containing all the initial strings plus all and only
those other strings over the vocabulary that are obtainable via the productions from some set
of strings all of which are themselves obtainable.
Post’s general metaschema for productions (Post 1943: 197) was given in terms of the
rather alarming display in (1), which needs a little interpretation.
(1) g11 Pi′1 g12 Pi′2 · · · g1m1 Pi′m1 g1(m1+1)
g21 Pi′′1 g22 Pi′′2 · · · g2m2 Pi′′m2 g2(m2+1)
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
gk1 Pi(k)1
gk2 Pi(k)2
· · · gkmk Pi(k)mk
gk(mk+1)
produce
g1 Pi1 g2 Pi2 · · · gm Pim gm+1
The gi symbols in this array are metasymbols that in actual productions would be specific
strings of symbols. (The subscripts on the g’s above the word “produce” are ordered pairs:
the jth occurrence of a g symbol in row k has the subscript k j.) The Pi symbols are very
different: they are free variables, the values of which are arbitrary sequences of symbols
present in the formulas to which the inference rules are applied. (In the lines above the word
“produce”, the jth occurrence of a P variable in row k has the subscript i(k)j ; for small values
of k, the “(k)” is written as a sequence of k primes. The rows may have different numbers of
5P’s and g’s; the number of P variables in row r is indicated by a number mr, so the number
of g’s in that row is mr+1.) A production does not tamper with the values of the P variables,
but merely carries over into the conclusion the values assigned when matching premises to
the schema.
P variables are rather like the “back references” of the editing language of the Unix
stream editor sed. A sed command that reduplicates a string that follows the symbol R can
be written in the form “s/R\(.*\)/R\1\1/”, where “\(.*\)” is a variable over arbitrary
strings and \1, \2, etc., are calls for values of such variables (\1 calls the value of the first
or leftmost variable, \2 calls the second, and so on). Such a command would correspond to
a production with one premise written as “R P1 produces R P1 P1”.
Post stipulates that all the P variables in a conclusion must appear somewhere in the
premises whose matching to already-obtained strings permit that conclusion to be obtained.
One might well ask how this condition—which I will refer to as No New Variables—could
possibly be compatible with any rule similar in effect to the ‘Disjunction Introduction’ fa-
miliar from natural deduction: a rule which permits the inference from α to α ∨ β , where
choice of β is arbitrary.2 But in fact there is no conflict here. No New Variables seems su-
perfluous in the sense that productions introducing new arbitrary variables can always be
eliminated in favor of new equivalent ones that comply with the condition. This is because
Post explicitly allowed production systems to operate on a larger vocabulary of symbols
than the set of symbols appearing in the assertions of the system. That is, the vocabulary for
a production system generating a set L∈Ω ∗T can be a set Ω =ΩT ∪ΩN where any symbol in
Ω can figure in the operations of the productions but the theorems (“assertions” or generated
strings) of the system have to be strings over ΩT .
For example, in the excellent elementary exposition of production systems given by
Brainerd & Landweber (1974, chapter 7: 168–170), such extra symbols are exploited in a
formalization of the propositional calculus by letting Ω include not just the terminal symbols
ΩT = {p,1,¬,⊃,(,)} (where “⊃” is the material implication connective) but also a set of
extra symbols to classify strings as propositional variables, well-formed formulae, axioms,
and theorems. In particular, if we let T have the intuitive interpretation “the following string
is a theorem”, then Modus Ponens, the only rule of inference assumed in the system they
formalize, can be formalized thus:
(2) {T P1, T (P1 ⊃ P2)} produce T P2
(An additional production allows T P1 to produce P1, so the final outputs of the system are
the theorems themselves, shorn of their T prefixes.)
Suppose we did want to posit in an axiomatic system an inference rule analogous to
the natural deduction rule of Disjunction Introduction, allow a theorem α to produce the
theorem α∨β for arbitrary β . Using an extra symbol F with the intuitive interpretation “the
following string is a well-formed formula” (for formation rules can also be expressed as
productions), we could formalize it thus:
(3) {T P1, F P2} produce T (P1∨P2)
And this formulation complies with No New Variables.
3.2 [Σ,F] grammars as production systems
SS defines “the form of grammar associated with the theory of linguistic structure based
upon constituent analysis” thus:
(4) Chomsky’s definition of [Σ,F] grammars
Each such grammar is defined by a finite set Σ of initial strings and a finite set F of
“instruction formulas” of the form X → Y interpreted: “rewrite X as Y .” Though X
need not be a single symbol, only a single symbol of X can be rewritten in forming Y .
[SS: 29]
Thereafter he refers to a grammar of this form as a “[Σ,F] grammar”. He gives this as an
example:
2 Jeff Pelletier raised this question. Lloyd Humberstone and Alasdair Urquhart helped me answer it.
6(5) Σ = {Z}
F = {Z → ab, Z → aZb}
The stringset generated by (5) is {anbn|n ≥ 1}. Chomsky adds:
It is important to observe that in describing this language we have introduced a sym-
bol Z which is not contained in the sentences of this language. This is the essential
fact about phrase structure which gives it its “abstract” character. [SS: 31]
Clearly, (4) is a special case of a production system: Σ is the set of initial strings or
primitive assertions, and F is the set of productions. One of the ways in which a [Σ,F]
grammar is more restricted than production systems in general is that its productions are
limited to just one premise. But it appears that otherwise the restrictions are not stringent.
The grammar in (5) is an unrepresentative one, since apart from the implicit P variables at the
beginning and end, the left hand sides contain only a single symbol. Chomsky specifically
says this does not have to be the case, but he gives no example at that point of a grammar
where in a rule X →Y we have |X |> 1, so the reader has to work out how things operate in
that case.
It is important in this connection to keep in mind that rewriting rules as SS presents them
apply to specified subparts of strings and keep the rest unchanged. What the rule Z → aZb
means is that P1 Z P2 produces P1 aZb P2. When it applies to a string like aaZbb, it does not
replace the whole thing by aZb; it replaces the part that matches the operative part of the left
hand side, namely Z, so the output is aaaZbbb. When Chomsky says that the left hand side
of a rule may consist of more than one symbol but only one symbol may be replaced, he
clearly means to allow for rules such as “xAy→ xBCy”, which means that P1 xAy P2 produces
P1 xBCy P2. Here again the parts of the string that are not explicitly changed must carry over
unchanged (rather than, say, disappear or randomly mutate), so the fact that more can be
specified before the arrow than just the single changed symbol means that we are dealing
with is context-sensitive rewriting.
The possibility that rewriting might make a string shorter is not ruled out in (4), so a rule
like “xAy → xy” is allowed in [Σ,F] grammars as defined in SS. This makes them identical
with what Harrison (1978: 17) calls “context-sensitive with erasing” grammars, which can
generate any r. e. stringset.3
In Post’s notation, the rules of [Σ,F] grammars would look like this:
(6) P1 g1 g2 g3 P2 produces P1 g1 g4 g3 P2
The extra symbols that Chomsky describes as essential to the abstract character of phrase
structure correspond to the extra symbols in ΩN that do not appear in assertions. In later
work, though not in SS, Chomsky refers to these extra symbols as “non-terminals”. Davis
(1994a, xiv) takes the P variables in a production system to correspond to the non-terminals
of formal language theory, but that is an error. Non-terminals like NP or V in SS are drawn
from a fixed, finite inventory of symbols that constitutes the alphabet for the strings that
productions manipulate. Post’s P variables, by contrast, are drawn from an infinite set of
indexed variables that form part of the metatheoretical apparatus and which never appear in
the symbol strings manipulated by productions.
The terminological habits of formal language theorists may have misled Davis on this
point: many computer science texts do refer to non-terminals in CF-PSGs as “variables”
because they act in a sense as variables over substrings in the terminal vocabulary: ‘NP’ can
stand for (i.e., have as its terminal yield) the boy or a girl, etc. But this an entirely different
notion from the one captured by Post’s P variables.
4 Transformations
When transformations are introduced in SS they are not defined with any precision. In fact
they are not really distinguished from informal descriptions of their effects (the discussion
3 Chomsky 1956b was more careful, and had the additional stipulation: “Neither the replaced symbol nor
the replacing string may be the identity element” (p. 117 in the 1956 version, p. 112 in the 1965 revision).
That limits [Σ,F] grammars to the context-sensitive.
7of the coordination principle in section 4.3 below makes this particularly clear). And some
of the statements made about them are clearly false. I will consider three specific examples
in the sections that follow.
4.1 Singulary transformations: Affix Hopping
The transformational rule known to many linguists as Affix Hopping, called “the Auxiliary
Transformation” in SS, is initially given in this form (SS: 39):
(7) Let Af stand for any of the affixes past, S, Ø, en, ing. Let v stand for any M or V , or
have or be (i.e., for any non-affix in the phrase Verb). Then:
Af + v → v Af #, where # is interpreted as word boundary.
It is claimed (SS: 40) that this rule “violates the requirements of [Σ,F] grammars . . . severely”
in that it “requires reference to constituent structure (i.e., past history of derivation) and in
addition, we have no way to express the required inversion within the terms of phrase struc-
ture.” Neither claim is true.
First, on derivational history, by “reference to constituent structure (i.e., past history of
derivation)” Chomsky means that in order to know whether (7) can apply to this string:
(8) the + man + S + have + en + be + ing + read + the + book
it is necessary to know that read was introduced by a step that had φ V ψ as its input line
(φ ,ψ ∈ Ω∗) and rewrote it as φ read ψ , which establishes that read “is a V”, so (7) can
apply.
But Chomsky seems to have failed to appreciate the power that the availability of extra
symbols affords him. In order that it should be possible to read off that read is a V , all
that is necessary is to carry over an extra symbol that says so. There is actually no need
for a reference specifically to V here: V acts the same way as M or have to be. What is
needed is identification of the items that count as falling under v and the items that count
as falling under Af. This could be done by introducing a new symbol V with the intuitive
meaning “the immediately following symbol counts as an instance of v”, and a new symbol
A with the intuitive meaning “the immediately following symbol counts as an instance of
Af ”. Instead of (8) we would have (9).
(9) the + man + A S + V have + A en + V be + A ing + V read + the + book
The special symbols could then be eliminated by rules equivalent to productions like “P1 +
VP2 +P3 produces P1 +P2 +P3” and so on. Rules do not need to be able to function like
“a more powerful machine, which can ‘look back’ to earlier strings in the derivation in
order to determine how to produce the next step in the derivation” (SS: 38). The engineering
metaphor seems entirely misguided.
Second, the claim that “we have no way to express the required inversion within the
terms of phrase structure” (to transform “Af v” into “v Af ”) is false. By “within the terms
of phrase structure” Chomsky means within the terms of [Σ,F] grammars. But as we have
seen, these are context-sensitive, not context-free, so they permit rules like “xAy→ xBy” (or
in the notation familiar from generative phonology, A → B / x y). Using a sequence of
rules of this form it is straightforward to convert a string AB into the string BA: it can be
done by the three rules AB → γB, γB → γA, and γA → BA, where γ is some non-terminal
not used elsewhere. The same holds for converting ‘ing + read’ (or A ing + V read) into
‘read + ing #’. Only relative to a certain fixed choice of symbol inventory can such an
inversion be said to fall outside the range of what [Σ,F] grammars can do.4
4 The first printing of SS contained a clearly erroneous statement about the power of [Σ,F] grammars. On
page 31 it was claimed that the copying stringset {xx|x ∈ (a,b)+} “cannot be produced by a grammar of this
type.” This is not true. A grammar generating it is given as the solution to an exercise by Partee, ter Meulen
and Wall (1993: 631, top). Some time in 1959 or later a correction was made to the plates of SS: the words
“unless the rules embody contextual restrictions” were added, along with a footnote reference to Chomsky
(1959). But as just noted, the rules in a [Σ,F] grammar as defined already incorporate contextual restrictions.
The correction should have said that the copying stringset cannot be produced by a grammar like (5) in which
the left hand side is a single symbol—a CF-PSG.
8It has never been clear to me why so many linguists who encountered SS regarded the
Auxiliary Transformation and the rest of the analysis of the verb and auxiliary system as
elegant and attractive. The analysis suffers from a host of fairly serious problems. It gives
rise to various ordering paradoxes and entails various counterintuitive constituency claims
(Gazdar, Pullum & Sag 1982, 613–616, provide a brief summary).
As one example of the kind of problem I refer to, consider the rule “V → V1 Prt”, pro-
posed on p. 75 as a way of treating verb-particle constructions like bring in as verbs. This
rule is incompatible with the Auxiliary Transformation no matter what we assume about V1.
If we assume V 6=V1, then since V falls under v but V1 does not, the Auxiliary Transforma-
tion will produce *bring inned and *bring inning instead of brought in and bringing in. If
we change the definition of v to include V1, both the desired brought in and bringing in and
the undesired *bring inned and *bring inning will be generated. And if we assume V = V1,
then we get recursion, leading to *bring in up, *bring in up out, *bring in up out on, etc., as
well as incorrect affix placements like *bring inning up and *bring in upping out.
Perhaps the most serious theoretical criticism of the SS treatment of auxiliaries is the
observation made by Sampson (1979): that the analysis is not compatible with the formal
theory of Chomsky’s magnum opus The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory (1956a,
henceforth LSLT), of which SS is supposed to be in effect an informal digest. Sampson notes
that (7) is not a legal transformation under the theory of LSLT. The reason has to do with the
status of the cover symbols v and Af. These are neither terminal symbols nor non-terminal
symbols; they are ad hoc devices, not sanctioned by the LSLT theory, with the function of
enabling 16 different transformations that share most of their structure to be (apparently)
collapsed into one. Thus one of the most famous of all the transformations in SS is not a
transformation at all under the LSLT definition.
4.2 Transformations with essential variables: wh-movement
Nothing so far illustrates any variables in SS that are like Post’s P variables in covering
arbitrary and unbounded substrings that are not necessarily constituents; but SS does include
one such case. The wh-fronting transformation5 called “Tw1 ” is formally stated thus (SS:
112):
(10) Tw1 : Structural analysis: X – NP – Y (X or Y may be null)
Structural change: X1 – X2 – X3 → X2 – X1 – X3
What the rule does is in effect to shift an NP to the beginning of a sentence across an
unbounded domain that may contain any arbitrary sequence of symbols, which illustrates
very clearly the difference between non-terminal symbols and Post-style P variables. In
later transformational literature, e.g. Postal (1971), variables of this sort became known as
“essential variables”. Ross’s celebrated dissertation (1967) is an exploration of universal
constraints that might be placed on rules making reference to them.
The Tw1 rule is tagged “optional and conditional on Tq” (SS: 112), where Tq is the
rule usually known as Subject-Auxiliary Inversion, which shifts to the left of an NP (i) an
immediately following concord morpheme (S or Ø or past) plus any instance of M or have
or be that may immediately follow that. The idea seems to be to front an NP only if the
sentence begins with an element falling under v. But exactly what is meant by making one
rule “conditional on” another is not explained: it would appear to be a global constraint on
derivations of the sort that in later work Chomsky would resolutely oppose.
The notational practice seen in (10), and in the formulation of all rules in the list in
pp. 112–114, is never explained in SS, and seems quite odd. There is no connection at all
between the X in the structural analysis (the input description) and the various Xi in the struc-
tural change (the output description). And although nothing is explicitly said, it is apparent
that for each i ≥ 1 we are supposed to match up Xi to the ith element in the structural anal-
ysis. It is strange that five variables are used to hold three values in (10). In Post’s notation,
the formulation would be simpler, with only two variables:
(11) P1 NP P2 produces NP P1 P2
5 It actually fronts NP, but there is a second subrule called Tw2 which changes NP at the beginning of a
sentence into wh + NP, and morphophonemic rules turn this into who or what.
94.3 Generalized transformations: Conjunction
SS also uses rules that would correspond to productions with more than one premise: these
are his “generalized transformations”. Six years after the publication of SS Chomsky &
Miller (1963: 284) proposed that all rules of grammar can be given in this form:
(12) φ1, . . . ,φn → φn+1
They explain: “each of the φi is a structure of some sort and . . . the relation → is to be
interpreted as expressing the fact that if our process of recursive specification generates the
structures φ1, . . . ,φn then it also generates the structure φn+1.” It should be clear that this just
summarizes Post’s production systems, omitting the details relating to the free variables and
the process of assigning them their values. The generalized transformations in SS are the
ones where n = 2.
The first such rule that Chomsky considers is called “Conjunction” on p. 113, but it is
introduced informally on p. 36, where it is stated thus:
(13) If S1 and S2 are grammatical sentences, and S1 differs from S2 only in that X appears
in S1 where Y appears in S2 (i.e., S1 = . . .X . . . and S2 = . . .Y . . .), and X and Y are
constituents of the same type in S1 and S2, respectively, then S3 is a sentence, where S3
is the result of replacing X by X + and +Y in S1 (i.e., S3 = . . X + and + Y . .).
This is referred to as a “rule”, but it is not a transformation in any formal sense. S1 and S2 are
required here to be ‘grammatical sentences’; i.e., strings actually generated by the grammar.
So (13) involves existential quantification over the entire content of the language. It is what
would later be called a transderivational constraint: the grammaticality of S3 depends on the
independently assessed grammaticality of two other sentences, S1 and S2.
Note in passing that the claim expressed by (13) is not true of English. There are
many cases of X and Y such that both can occur in a given context but the coordination
X and Y cannot. An obvious one involves verb agreement. If X = Xavier and Y = Yves, for
I think X is eligible and I think Y is eligible we have the prediction from (13) that *I think
Xavier and Yves is eligible should be grammatical, but it is not. Several other such failures
of (13) are catalogued by Huddleston & Pullum (2002, pp. 1323–1326).
There is no attempt in SS to deal with multiple coordination—cases where there are
more than two coordinates. No kind of finite production system can provide the kind of
analysis for multiple coordination that seems linguistically desirable (namely, an analysis
with unranked trees with no bound on branching degree), because in any such system there
is a longest right hand side. Generalized transformations are likewise of no use: an infinite
set of rules of the form in (12) would be called for, one for each n. The problem lingers down
to recent times; see Borsley 2003 for a critique of contemporary work that tries to solve the
problem by reducing all coordination to binary structure. (Note, however, that a beautiful
solution is available in non-generative terms: see Rogers 1999.)
Chomsky recognizes that “additional qualification is necessary” to his description, but
nonetheless claims that “the grammar is enormously simplified if we set up constituents in
such a way that [(13)] holds even approximately” (SS: 37). So let us consider just the matter
of formulation.
What is really striking is that when (13) is stated more formally in the summary rules at
the end of the book (p. 113), the result is considerably less explicit and less accurate than
(13). The rule statement is given in (14).
(14) Structural analysis: of S1: Z−X −W
of S2: Z−X −W
where X is a minimal element (e.g., NP, VP, etc.) and
Z,W are segments of terminal strings.
Structural change: (X1−X2−X3; X4−X5 −X6)→
X1−X2 +and+X5 −X3
It is now clear that S1 and S2 will not be sentences (strings over the terminal vocabulary);
they will be stages in a derivation, including nonterminals.
X is stipulated to be a ‘minimal element’, and although this term is undefined, it appears
to mean ‘single nonterminal’. Z and W , however, are stipulated in a prose annotation to be
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‘segments of terminal strings’. This means, assuming that the string values are supposed to
be the same in each case, that S1 and S2 are completely identical, and there was no point in
distinguishing them. They will be what Lasnik (2000: 31) calls “monostrings”: strings con-
taining only one non-terminal. In the case where X = NP, they will be strings like Put NP in
the truck. The intent is that since Put the dog in the truck and Put the toolbox in the truck
are both grammatical, and the dog and the toolbox can both be the terminal yield of an NP,
Put the dog and the toolbox in the truck should also be grammatical.
A small problem immediately becomes apparent: (14) does not guarantee any difference
between the terminal strings of the X constituents in S1 and S2, so (14) yields *Put it and it
in the truck as an output, which is probably unintended (since in (13) it was stated that ‘S1
differs from S2’: the intention was for S1 and S2 to be identical sentential forms that are
somehow guaranteed to have distinct generated terminal strings).
Closer examination reveals that nothing really turns on making reference to S1 and S2
at all. No use is ever made of the variables Z and W in the ‘structural change’. We are
apparently supposed to intuit that (i) all of the Xi variables range over terminal strings;
(ii) X1 = X4 = Z; (iii) X3 = X6 =W ; (iv) X2 6= X4; and (v) X2 and X4 are terminal strings of
instances of the category X . None of this is made explicit in (14) or elsewhere.
The “Conjunction” transformation seems to be a remarkably inexpert use of mathe-
matical symbolism, but for what it is worth, it would be straightforwardly expressible as a
production with two premises in Post’s formalism. However, its descriptive content appears
to be specifiable much more simply. All it really does is to ensure that a nonterminal symbol
X can exhaustively dominate a string of the form ‘X and X’, in any context where X can
appear. CF-PSG rules could do that. And a rule like ‘NP→NP and NP’ would represent the
dog and the toolbox as an NP, which (14) does not do. (See Gazdar 1981, which begins with
essentially that observation and derives from it some remarkably wide-ranging conclusions).
5 Generative capacity
There seems to be no important difference in mathematical character between a TGG and a
production system. In saying this I do not mean to deny that certain specific organizational
proposals are explicit or implicit in SS. For example, Chomsky bifurcates the grammar into
a set of non-recursive CF-PSG productions generating a finite “kernel” and a set of trans-
formations providing derivations for the rest of the sentences. But one could equally well
take a production system defining the propositional calculus and set it out with formation
rules like “F P produces F (¬P)” segregated from the transformation rules like Modus Po-
nens (as (2) formalizes it). Such a separation would seem to be a presentational decision
about formalisms, not a substantive claim about languages or logics. Production systems are
generative grammars of an extremely general sort, and all the rules of SS seem to fall into
place within the theory of Post’s production systems.
Chomsky does add some elaborations to production systems that I have not yet men-
tioned. One is “extrinsic” rule ordering: the requirement that a grammar should define a
strict total order on its rules, each rule being permitted to apply only if it is applicable to
what has been obtained after all the rules ordered before it have had their chance to apply,
and before any of the rules ordered after it have had their chance. Another is the classifica-
tion of rules into the optional (which are permitted to apply when their turn in the ordering
comes but do not have to) and the obligatory (which must apply if they can when their turn
comes). But these devices do not seem to introduce any new mathematical possibilities. No
one ever offered an example of a stringset that can be generated by some unordered set of
productions but cannot be generated by any ordered set (even over a vocabulary containing
additional non-terminals).6 Likewise no one ever offered a case in which tagging rules as
optional or obligatory was an absolute necessity. Productions are intuitively optional: where
more than one production is applicable to some substring, any of the eligible ones is permit-
6 This is different from saying that ordering cannot restrict what a particular set of rules can generate.
Pelletier (1980) shows that requiring strict ordering of a set of rules can indeed make some outputs impossible
to generate. But as he stresses, this result presumes that the set of rules is fixed, which is not the position
linguists are ever in.
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ted to apply. But all that is necessary to make a rule r intuitively obligatory is to ensure the
presence in the relevant strings of some non-terminal that only r can eliminate.
Considerations such as these relate to the question of the generative capacity or expres-
sive power of grammars. And it turns out that Post, having in effect invented generative
grammars, also proved the first two theorems concerning generative capacity. He called his
maximally general production systems, with productions as in (1), “canonical systems”, and
his major result in Post (1943) was a theorem concerning the expressive power of production
systems having a radically limited format for productions.
5.1 Normal systems
Post (1943) proves that every set generated by a canonical system can also be generated by
a system in a much more restricted format called a “normal system”. In a normal system
there is just one axiom, and all productions have a single premise and take this form, where
x and y are particular given strings:
(15) x P produces P y
To be more precise, Post’s theorem is stated as in (16):
(16) Theorem (Post 1943) Given a canonical system Γ over a finite vocabulary ΩT it is
always possible to construct a normal system Γ′ over Ω = ΩT ∪ΩN such that x ∈ Ω∗T
is an assertion of Γ′ iff x is an assertion of Γ.
Thus even a radical restriction on rule form, limiting all rules to saying “A string beginning
with x may be rewritten with its x prefix erased and y added at the end”, may have no effect
at all on generative capacity.
5.2 Semi-Thue rules
There is another specially limited form of productions. Chomsky (1962) calls these “rewrit-
ing rules”, and recognizes explicitly that they are restricted forms of Post’s production sys-
tems:
A rewriting rule is a special case of a production in the sense of Post; a rule of the
form ZXW → ZYW, where Z or W (or both) may be null. (Chomsky 1962: 539)
This is just another way of presenting the [Σ,F] grammars considered earlier; in Post’s no-
tation the rules would have the form shown in (6). But the particular special case under
consideration originates in a technical paper from ten years before in which Post (following
a suggestion by Alonzo Church) tackled an open question posed by Axel Thue (1914). Thue
had asked whether there was a decision procedure for determining whether a specified string
X could be converted into a given string Y by a set of rules of the form “WXZ ↔WY Z”,
where W,X ,Y,Z are strings over some fixed finite alphabet and φ ↔ ψ is to be read as “φ
may be replaced by ψ or conversely”.
The problem might be seen as motivated by logical equivalences such as DeMorgan’s
Laws (¬(p∧ q)↔ (¬p∨¬q) and (¬(p∨ q)↔ (¬p∧¬q)): using some finite set of logical
equivalencies such as these, is the formula ϕ1 logically equivalent to the formula ϕ2 or not?
Post (1947) answers Thue’s question by reduction: he proves that (i) if we could decide
derivability for a Thue system (where for any rule φ →ψ belonging to the system the inverse
ψ → φ also belongs) we could also decide it for “semi-Thue” systems where the inverse is
not present; and (ii) that would mean decidability of the full range of stringsets that normal
or canonical systems can generate, which is provably unsolvable. “Semi-Thue” productions
are of course simply Chomsky’s type-0 rules.
The actual systems studied by Thue are not generative grammars: they have no initial
strings and no distinction between terminal and non-terminal symbols. But Post’s interest
was in what rules of the semi-Thue form could generate, and the theorem he proved has
direct application to generative grammars.
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5.3 Recursive enumerability
Post understood that the class of stringsets that canonical production systems can generate
is the r. e. stringsets. Not only do arbitary systems of rules of inference as formalized by
canonical systems yield all and only the r. e. stringsets, but the same is true for rules in the
much more limited normal systems and semi-Thue systems. Both results show that radical
limitations on the form of rules may have no effect on what can be generated.
The importance of Chomsky (1959) lay in its demonstration that other restrictions did
limit what could be generated. If erasing is forbidden, context-sensitive grammars generate
only the context-sensitive (“type-1”) stringsets; and rules with only one symbol on the left
hand side generate only the context-free (“type-2”). But the transformations introduced in
SS observed no such restrictions.
Hilary Putnam (1961) saw the implications of this very clearly. After discussing some
intuitive reasons why we should want to regard natural language stringsets as recursive (de-
cidable) sets, he stated (p. 41): “Chomsky’s general characterization of a transformational
grammar is much too wide. It is easy to show that any recursively enumerable set of sen-
tences could be generated by a transformational grammar in Chomsky’s sense.” He gave no
proof of this, but his conclusion was correct, as others later verified in detail (see Peters &
Ritchie 1971 and 1973, inter alia). And clearly, if even normal systems (where rules can say
nothing more than “g1 P produces P g2”) capture the r. e. stringsets, it is hard to see how the
rule formalism of SS could not. After all, [Σ,F] grammars already generate any r. e. set, and
SS attempts to show that those are not expressive enough.
6 Conclusions
This paper has concerned itself only with some of the mathematical and logical foundations
and antecedents of SS, and the coherence of its formalism.7 One might ask why we should
care about faults in a monograph that is now more than 50 years old. The answer I would give
is that myths about scientific breakthroughs and results can warp practitioners’ perceptions
of the history of a field, with bad consequences for the conduct of science.
We know from the history of science in general that it is often wrong to attribute a
new idea to one person. There is no answer to whether Wallace or Darwin conceived of
evolution by natural selection, whether Priestley or Lavoisier discovered oxygen, whether
the calculus is due to Leibniz or Newton (or even Cauchy, who first provided it with a
rigorous mathematical basis). Discoveries and innovations develop over time and build on
earlier developments and adjacent fields. A monogenesis myth that has a research program
springing from nowhere in the mind of a lone genius may be bad for science in at least two
ways, both of which are worth guarding against.
The first is that such myths encourage linguists in complacent maintenance of false
assumptions. If almost everyone believes that SS showed transformations to be necessary
back in 1957, non-transformational syntactic research is bound to remain underdeveloped
and underexplored, as indeed I think it has been over the past fifty years.
The second is that they promote biased and lazy citation practices: passing the same old
references from paper to paper without anyone checking that the sources said what people
think they said. SS does not properly credit the earlier literature on which it draws. Chomsky
has never cited any paper of Post’s other than Post (1944), an informal paper deriving from a
lecture to the American Mathematical Society on r. e. sets of positive integers, which is cited
in Chomsky (1959: 137n) and Chomsky (1961: 7) as an example of someone using the term
“generate” in the mathematical sense. Post is mentioned without a bibliographical citation
in two other places (Chomsky 1962: 539, and 1965: 9), but Chomsky has never cited Post’s
7 The empirical claims SS makes about English are also thoroughly flawed, but I do not have space to
discuss them here. Note also that Harman (1963) published a response to SS, showing that through the use
of what were in effect feature distinctions on category labels a CF-PSG could do all of what transformations
were called upon to do in SS. Gazdar (1982: 134) provides a retrospective appreciation of Harman’s work and
a criticism of the “terminological imperialism” of Chomsky’s unsatisfying response to it.
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technical papers on production systems.8 Other linguists, and even historians of linguistics
(the generally very interesting work of Tomalin 2006, for example), tend to simply follow
Chomsky, citing only what he cites.
The contributions of Zellig Harris are also somewhat downplayed in SS. The standard
view is that Harris worked solely on methods of “taxonomic” bottom-up utterance analysis
and SS introduced grammars that synthesized sentences top-down. But Harris (as Seuren
2009 points out) explicitly envisages top-down generation:
The work of analysis leads right up to the statements which enable anyone to synthe-
size or predict utterances in the language. These statements form a deductive system
with axiomatically defined initial elements and with theorems concerning the rela-
tions among them. The final theorems would indicate the structure of the utterances
of the language in terms of the preceding parts of the system. [Harris 1951: 372–373,
quoted by Seuren 2009: 107]
So Harris clearly saw that formal axiomatic systems could be exploited as generative pro-
duction systems, generating well-formed strings rather than logical theorems. And he saw
it ten years before SS appeared9 (the preface to Methods in Structural Linguistics is dated
January 1947, and credits the young Chomsky, who read it in proof when he was an under-
graduate, for “much-needed assistance with the manuscript”).
SS is credited with a degree of originality, explicitness, and technical coherence that it
does not actually exhibit, but to say that is not to deny that somehow it managed to stimulate
other linguists to strive for these virtues. Its effect was catalytic rather than substantive (it
contains no results that are defended in detail today). It may be that some will dismiss the
foregoing discussion as just a negative book review offered fifty years too late, but in a sense
that would underrate the importance of SS. Only in the light of the subsequent developments
in linguistics that SS managed to encourage could my evaluation of its content have been
undertaken. It would have been very useful for linguists to have access, by about 1960, to
a detailed critical review of SS; but the simple fact is that it would have been impossible,
because absolutely no linguist at that time could have written it.
Acknowledgements My philosopher collaborator Barbara Scholz contributed generously to this research,
helping to develop the ideas as well as advising on how better to express them. I thank her and Gerald
Gazdar, Lloyd Humberstone, Robert Levine, Jeff Pelletier, Geoffrey Sampson, and Thomas Wasow for helpful
criticisms on earlier drafts; Frederick Newmeyer, Pieter Seuren, Marcus Tomalin, and Alasdair Urquhart
for useful conversations and correspondence; my referees for their input; and Andrew Garrett for kindly
providing me with a copy of the first printing of SS. These people do not necessarily agree with what I have
decided to say (some definitely don’t), so they should not be blamed for my errors.
References
Bever TG, Fodor JA, Garrett M (1968) A formal limitation of associationism. In: Dixon TR,
Horton DL (eds) Verbal Behavior and General Behavior Theory, Prentice-Hall, Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ, pp 582–585
Borsley RD (2003) Against ConjP. Lingua 115:461–482
Brainerd WS, Landweber LH (1974) Theory of Computation. John Wiley, New York
Carnap R (1934) Logische Syntax der Sprache. Julius Springer, Vienna, translated as The
Logical Syntax of Language, Kegan Paul, 1937
Chomsky N (1956a) The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory. MIT Library, Cambridge,
MA, microfilmed; revised version of a 1955 unpublished manuscript
Chomsky N (1956b) Three models for the description of language. IRE Transactions on
Information Theory IT-2:113–123, reprinted with substantive revisions in Luce, Bush &
Galanter (1965), 105–124
Chomsky N (1957) Syntactic Structures. Mouton, The Hague
8 Urquhart (2009) suggests that this might be because Chomsky’s understanding of Post systems came
from a secondary source, namely Rosenbloom (1950), which is cited in Chomsky (1956a) and Chomsky
(1956b). SS cites neither Rosenbloom (1950) nor anything by Post.
9 Newmeyer is mistaken in stating (1986: 5n) that the generative proposals Chomsky made in his under-
graduate and master’s theses on Hebrew in 1949 and 1951 antedate Harris’s insights.
14
Chomsky N (1959) On certain formal properties of grammars. Information and Control
2:137–167, reprinted in Luce, Bush & Galanter (1965, 125–155; citation to original is
incorrect)
Chomsky N (1961) On the notion ‘rule of grammar’. In: Proceedings of the Twelfth Sympo-
sium in Applied Mathematics, American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, pp 6–24,
reprinted with slight revision in Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz (eds.), The Structure
of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language, 155–210 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall)
Chomsky N (1962) Explanatory models in linguistics. In: Nagel E, Suppes P, Tarski A (eds)
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International
Congress, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, pp 528–550
Chomsky N (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Chomsky N (1975) The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory. Plenum, New York, pub-
lished version of Chomsky (1956a)
Chomsky N, Miller GA (1963) Introduction to the formal analysis of natural languages. In:
Luce RD, Bush RR, Galanter E (eds) Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, vol II, John
Wiley and Sons, New York, pp 269–321
Daly RT (1974) Applications of the Mathematical Theory of Linguistics. Mouton, The
Hague
Davis M (1994a) Emil L. Post: His life and work. In Davis 1994b, xi–xxviii
Davis M (ed) (1994b) Solvability, Provability, Definability: The Collected Works of Emil L.
Post. Birkha¨user, Boston
Firth JR (1957) Papers in Linguistics 1934–1951. Oxford University Press, London
Fitch WT, Hauser MD (2004) Computational constraints on syntactic processing in nonhu-
man primates. Science 303:377–380
Gazdar G (1981) Unbounded dependencies and coordinate structure. Linguistic Inquiry
12:155–184
Gazdar G (1982) Phrase structure grammar. In: Jacobson P, Pullum GK (eds) The Nature of
Syntactic Representation, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Netherlands, pp 131–186
Gazdar G, Pullum GK, Sag IA (1982) Auxiliaries and related phenomena in a restrictive
theory of grammar. Language 58:591–638
Harman G (1963) Generative grammars without transformation rules. Language 39:597–
616
Harris ZS (1951) Methods in Structural Linguistics. Oxford University Press, New York
Harrison M (1978) Introduction to Formal Language Theory. Addison-Wesley, Reading,
MA
Huddleston R, Pullum GK (2002) The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge
Joos M (ed) (1957) Readings in Linguistics I: The Development of Descriptive Linguistics
in America since 1925, 1st edn. American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, DC
Lasnik H (2000) Syntactic Structures Revisited: Contemporary Lectures on Classic Trans-
formational Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Lees RB (1957) Review of Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structures. Language 33:375–408
Lightfoot D (2002) Introduction. In Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, second edition,
v–xviii. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin
Luce RD, Bush RR, Galanter E (eds) (1965) Readings in Mathematical Psychology, vol II.
John Wiley & Sons, New York
Lyons J (1970) Chomsky. Fontana, London
Newmeyer FJ (1986) Has there been a ‘Chomskyan revolution’ in linguistics? Language
62(1):1–18
Partee BH, ter Meulen A, Wall RE (1993) Mathematical Methods in Linguistics, corrected
first edn. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht
Pelletier FJ (1980) The generative power of rule orderings in formal grammars. Linguistics
18(1/2 (227/228)):17–72
Pereira F (2000) Formal grammar and information theory: Together again? Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society 358(1769):1239–1253
15
Peters PS, Ritchie RW (1971) On restricting the base component of transformational gram-
mars. Information and Control 18:483–501
Peters PS, Ritchie RW (1973) On the generative power of transformational grammars. In-
formation Sciences 6:49–83
Philological Society (1957) Studies in Linguistic Analysis. Philological Society, Oxford
Post E (1921) Introduction to a general theory of elementary propositions. American Journal
of Mathematics 43:163–185, reprinted in Jan van Heijenoort, ed., From Frege to Go¨del: A
Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931, Harvard University Press, Cambridge
MA, 1967, 264-283
Post E (1943) Formal reductions of the general combinatory decision problem. American
Journal of Mathematics 65:197–215, reprinted in Davis 1994b, 442–460.
Post E (1944) Recursively enumerable sets of positive integers and their decision problems.
Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 50:284–316, reprinted in Davis 1994b,
461–494.
Post E (1947) Recursive unsolvability of a problem of Thue. Journal of Symbolic Logic
12:1–11, reprinted in Davis 1994b, 503–513.
Postal PM (1971) Crossover Phenomena. Holt Rinehart and Winston, New York
Pullum GK, Scholz BC (2007) Systematicity and natural language syntax. Croatian Journal
of Philosophy 7:375–402
Pullum GK, Scholz BC (2009) For universals (but not finite-state learning), visit the zoo.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32(5):466–467
Putnam H (1961) Some issues in the theory of grammar. In: Jakobson R (ed) Structure of
Language and Its Mathematical Aspects, no. 12 in Proceedings of Symposia in Applied
Mathematics, American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, pp 25–42
Rogers J (1999) The descriptive complexity of generalized local sets. In: Kolb HP, Mo¨nnich
U (eds) The Mathematics of Syntactic Structure: Trees and their Logics, no. 44 in Studies
in Generative Grammar, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, pp 21–40
Rogers J, Pullum GK (2010) Aural pattern recognition experiments and the subregular hier-
archy. In this issue
Rogers, Jr H (1967) The Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Computability.
McGraw-Hill, New York
Rosenbloom P (1950) The Elements of Mathematical Logic. Dover, New York
Ross JR (1967) Constraints on variables in syntax. PhD thesis, MIT, Cambridge, MA, du-
plicated version published in 1968 by Indiana University Linguistics Club, Bloomington,
IN. Later published in book form as Infinite Syntax! (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1986)
Sampson G (1979) What was transformational grammar? Lingua 48:355–378, reprinted in
Empirical Linguistics, Continuum, 2001
Scholz BC, Pullum GK (2007) Tracking the origins of transformational generative grammar.
Journal of Linguistics 43:701–723
Seuren P (2009) Concerning the roots of transformational generative grammar. Histori-
ographia Linguistica 36(1):97–115
Skinner BF (1957) Verbal Behavior. Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York
Svenonius L (1957) Review of ‘Three models for the description of language’ by Noam
Chomsky. Journal of Symbolic Logic 23:71–72
Thue A (1914) Probleme u¨ber Vera¨nderungen von Zeichenreihen nach gegebenen
Regeln. In: Skrifter utgit av Videnskapsselskapet i Kristiana, I, no. 10 in Matematisk-
naturvidenskabelig klasse, Norske Videnskaps-Akademi, Oslo
Tomalin M (2006) Linguistics and the Formal Sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge
Urquhart A (2009) Emil Post. In: Gabbay DM, Woods J (eds) Handbook of the History of
Logic, Volume 5: Logic from Russell to Church, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 617–666
